Article originally prepared for an AIPLA CLE program that was available to event attendees but not formally published.
What happens when someone files a trademark for your brand in China before you even enter the market? For thousands of companies each year, that nightmare is still a reality.
Introduction
Bad‑faith trademark filings remain a persistent challenge in China’s trademark system, despite successive rounds of legislative reform. For example, one can easily find dozens to hundreds of trademark filings for “ChatGPT” and “Squid Game,” even though the former has never been released in China and Netflix is not permitted to operate in China.
From the 2019 Trademark Law Amendment through the 2023 draft revision (pending), the Chinese legislature and administrative agencies have progressively tightened rules against applications lacking intent to use, mass filings, and registrations designed to exploit the rights of legitimate brand owners. These reforms reflect China’s commitment to aligning with international norms, protecting consumers, and discouraging trademark squatting, while also raising new compliance and strategic considerations for brand owners.
One of the primary goals in the 2023 amendment is to curb bad‑faith filings. Although it contains many improvements, it also has unexpected effects—including practical impacts on brands—and disrupts decades‑long strategies for brand protection in China. The following sections analyze the pros, cons, and practical impacts.
2019 Trademark Law Amendment
The 2019 amendment introduced several key provisions specifically aimed at bad‑faith filings:
- Article 4 (Amended): Applications filed in bad faith without intent to use “shall be rejected.”
- Article 19 (Amended): Trademark agents may not represent applicants in bad‑faith filings when they “know or should know” of the violation.
- Article 33 (Amended): Any interested party may oppose an application during the publication period if it appears to be filed in bad faith (i.e., in violation of Article 4).
- Article 44 (Amended): CNIPA or any party may seek invalidation of a registered trademark if it was filed in bad faith (i.e., in violation of Article 4).
These provisions empowered examiners to proactively reject suspect filings, expanded opportunities for third parties to intervene, and enhanced accountability for agents. Collectively, they signaled a shift toward a more integrity-driven trademark regime. Yet they were not sufficient to curb the broader trend of bad-faith filings. High-profile events underscored the challenge: during the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, for example, authorities recorded more than 1,000 trademark applications attempting to register the name of Olympian Eileen Gu and the official mascot Bing Dwen Dwen. The visibility of such cases highlighted persistent loopholes and helped accelerate momentum for another round of legislative amendments in 2023, which took a more comprehensive approach to tackling bad faith.
Draft 2023 Trademark Law (Fifth Amendment, Pending)
In 2023, China released a draft of its fifth Trademark Law amendment, with Article 22 as the centerpiece provision targeting bad-faith filings. Outline of Article 22 is below. The draft explicitly identifies several forms of bad faith, including massive filings without intent to use (targeting trademark hoarding practices), deceptive or improper applications, marks harmful to public interest, pre-emptive registrations involving well-known marks, agents, or company names, intentional infringement for unlawful profit, and a catch-all clause covering other malicious conduct not expressly listed.
Key provisions in Draft Article 22:
- Massive filings without intent to use: Targets trademark‑hoarding practices.
- Deceptive or improper applications: Bars use of misleading or fraudulent methods.
- Harm to public interest: Prohibits marks detrimental to national, social, or public welfare.
- Pre‑emptive registration: Extends protection to well‑known marks, agents, and company names.
- Catch‑all clause: Covers other malicious conduct not expressly listed.
The inclusion of Article 22 offers several important advantages. China would become one of the first major jurisdictions to enumerate detailed categories of bad faith in statutory text, providing clarity for examiners, courts, and practitioners. This specificity also strengthens the legal basis for AMR administrative enforcement. Article 83 reinforces this by stating that bad-faith applications which cause damages and fall under Article 22(4) shall be liable for compensation, with recovery to include at least the reasonable expenses incurred by the brand owner to stop the registration. In addition, penalties for bad-faith applicants are significantly increased, with fines raised from the prior cap of RMB 10,000 (roughly US$1,500) to RMB 250,000 (roughly US$35,000). This marks a notable escalation in deterrence compared to the 2019 framework.
At the same time, the draft leaves important challenges unresolved. It does not directly address one of the most common forms of bad-faith behavior in China—applications for marks that are confusingly similar to an already registered trademark. For example, under the proposed amendment, an application for LUXURY TIFFANY (a clear imitation of Tiffany’s Class 14 registration) or LAKE TAHOE MARRIOTT (a mimic of Marriott’s existing Class 43 restaurant registration) would not necessarily qualify as a “bad-faith” filing, despite the obvious intent to trade on the reputation of established brands. This is because the catch-all clause in Article 22(4) does not reference Article 24 (i.e., Article 30 of the existing law) (conflicts with other “registered” rights). Instead, it lists only limited grounds such as Article 18 (well-known trademark protection), Article 19 (agents acting in bad faith), and Article 23 (other prior rights than registered trademark rights). Moreover, not all circumstances permit civil-damages claims under Article 22, leaving gaps in enforcement. Finally, the framework still places heavy monitoring and enforcement costs on brand owners, who must invest significant resources in watch notices, oppositions, and invalidations to defend their marks.
In sum, the draft amendment represents both progress and compromise. By defining bad faith in detail and raising penalties, it strengthens deterrence and provides new tools for enforcement. Yet its failure to fully capture the most prevalent tactics of bad-faith filers, coupled with the ongoing (excessive and quite unnecessary) financial burden on rights holders, means that brand owners must continue to pursue proactive strategies to protect their marks in China. Yet ironically, those very proactive steps could themselves be challenged, or even labeled as ‘bad faith,’ under the amendment.
Enforcement and Policy Initiatives (2023–2025)
China has also introduced governance mechanisms beyond the statutory text. Under the Systemic Governance Plan (2023–2025), CNIPA launched a comprehensive framework to combat bad-faith filings, emphasizing “full-spectrum” regulation from examination to enforcement. By mid-2025, CNIPA has reported large-scale reviews and rejections, invalidated deceptive registrations, and rejected nearly one million applications likely to cause consumer confusion. It also tightened oversight of malicious non-use cancellation filings and imposed stricter review standards. These developments reflect an increasingly active administrative role, extending the fight against bad faith beyond litigation into proactive governance. Perhaps the most significant immediate benefit for brand owners is the formal recognition of suspension in trademark proceedings. This change eliminates the endless cycle of refilings and appeals that wasted resources in the past, as parties can now suspend a pending appeal until the outcome of an underlying action—such as a non-use cancellation or invalidation against a bad-faith mark—is resolved.
Comparative and International Context
China’s reforms echo developments in the European Union and United States, where intent‑to‑use standards, bad‑faith opposition grounds, and sanctions on malicious litigation have become important safeguards. By embedding bad faith as an explicit ground for refusal, opposition, and invalidation, China is aligning its system more closely with these global norms while adapting them to a high‑volume filing environment.
Practical Implications for Brand Owners
For brand owners, the evolving framework in China carries both risks and opportunities. On the one hand, filing strategies have become stricter: defensive applications now face narrower leeway (the infamous “Article 4” refusals), as only filings supported by actual use or intent are sustainable. Without confidence that bad-faith registrations will be rejected or cancelled, companies cannot safely avoid pre-emptive filings in adjacent classes, even if they have no immediate business plans. For example, if PELOTON enters China, it will naturally register Classes 28, 25, and 41, but leaving gaps in Classes 32 (energy drinks), 27 (yoga mats), or 09/14 (smartwatches) would create openings for squatters. Such opportunistic filings could not only damage brand image—imagine “PELOTON” energy drinks not made by Peloton—but also raise public health and safety concerns. On the other hand, litigation has become a stronger deterrent. With civil compensation available, brand owners can pursue damages more aggressively, and Chinese courts are increasingly awarding not just thousands but millions of U.S. dollars in trademark disputes. High-profile cases include Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Guangzhou Qiancai Cosmetic Co., Beijing Intellectual Property Court, First Instance, April 5, 2024 (2022 Jing 73 Min Chu 1134), Beijing High Court, Second Instance July 17, 2025 (2024 Jing Min Zhong 730), which resulted in one of the largest damage awards to a U.S. brand in China — RMB 50 million (approx. USD 7 million) for infringement of its well-known “Extra” chewing gum mark. Importantly, punitive damages are now being awarded beyond Beijing and Shanghai, extending into tier-2 and tier-3 cities, thereby strengthening the nationwide fight against bad-faith squatters.
Conclusion
China’s evolving approach to bad-faith trademark filings—from the 2019 reforms through the pending 2023 draft and the 2023–2025 enforcement plan—signals a decisive shift toward deterrence and systemic governance. For international brand owners, these changes create both risks and opportunities: narrower tolerance for defensive over-filing, but stronger remedies against squatters.
A critical unresolved question is what will count as “use” in China if use becomes a statutory requirement for maintaining trademark rights. On one hand, this reform would be a welcome tool against abuse. On the other, it could undermine long-standing defensive filing strategies that global companies rely on to protect their business across manufacturing, export, and retail. If “use” is defined too narrowly, legitimate brand owners risk being cast as hoarders—or even “bad-faith” actors—rather than as rights holders employing sensible strategies to safeguard their IP assets.
The answer carries profound implications. Companies must now consider whether token use, manufacturing-only activity, or limited distribution will suffice to preserve rights. As enforcement intensifies, proactive portfolio management, robust evidence-of-use planning, and strategic deployment of opposition and invalidation tools will be essential to safeguarding trademarks in the Chinese market.
References
- Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (2019 Amendment), Articles 4, 19, 33, 44.
- CNIPA, Draft Trademark Law Amendment (2023), Article 22.
- Yongxin Viewpoint — CNIPA Draft Trademark Law Amendment (Key Highlights), WeChat, available athttps://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/yknNJlwo37ap4XV3r016cg
- Regulatory Interpretation — Improving the Framework to Curb Bad-Faith Trademark Filings, WeChat, available at https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/S77VZEZ–4JjcOJ5wVHvjg
- Huang Hui, “Three Important Issues in China’s Fifth Trademark Law Amendment,” WeChat, available at: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/p6_tqxBGFjfbzq6OvVUPgA
- King & Wood Mallesons, “Adaptation and Evolution of the Trademark Law,” March 3, 2023, available at: https://www.kwm.com/cn/en/insights/latest-thinking/adaptation-and-evolution-of-the-trademark-law.html
- CNIPA, Systemic Governance of Bad‑Faith Trademark Filings 2023–2025, available at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2023-05/10/content_5754758.htm
- Sky v. SkyKick, Case C‑371/18, Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
